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Abstract  
The governance of IT outsourcing (ITO) has been identified as an essential determinant for ITO 
success. While prior studies have shed light on how to determine effective governance to inform 
practice, little research attention has been reversely initiated from practice when certain governance 
model is implemented. In this paper, I have addressed two concepts of Governance-in-Contract (GiC) 
and Governance-in-Practice (GiP) incorporating social network perspective and practice theory. The 
theoretical framework is built upon the stage of psychological contract in Miranda and Kavan’s 
(2005) Moment of Governance (MoG) model. I applied a portion of the framework in a single case 
study combining Social Network Analysis (SNA) and document analysis. The findings contrast GiP 
with GiC, and show how they are interrelated on the same stage of psychological contract. I hope to 
inspire future studies to further investigate the GiP with qualitative enquiries such as in-depth 
interviews, combining deeper SNA with pertinent quantitative measures. 
 
Keywords: IT outsourcing governance, practice theory, Social Network Analysis (SNA), psychological 
contract.  
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1 Introduction 
During the last two decades, the outsourcing of information technology (IT) has become a significant 
part of management, manifested by the increasing IT expenditure in major organizations (Lacity, 
Khan, Yan and Willcocks, 2010). Concerning the success of IT outsourcing (ITO), practice associated 
with ITO governance has been identified as one of the essential determinants (Lacity, Khan and 
Willcocks, 2009). In the discipline of IT, governance is defined as “the framework for decision rights 
and accountabilities to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT” (Weill, 2004, p.3). An 
abundance of literatures have focused on the interaction of different governance mechanisms (Goo, 
Kishore, Rao and Nam, 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sabherwal, 1999; Saunders, Gebelt and Hu, 
1997), or the development of prescriptive governance models circumscribed by the ITO context (Koh, 
Ang and Straub, 2004). While these prior studies have shed light on how to determine effective 
governance, little research attention has been directed on what actually happens when certain 
governance model is implemented in an ITO practice. Considering the relationship between research 
and practice, most of these studies are building theories to inform practice or striving to provide 
certain practical solutions. However, due to the emergence nature of governance models (Miranda and 
Kavan, 2005), especially considering the persistent interactions between client and supplier in ITO, the 
subsequent practice would fail to conform to the pre-defined governance model more often than not. 
The purpose of this research is to construct a theoretical framework with a practical research approach 
to effectively identify governance practices in ITO, and hence facilitate its comparison with the formal 
governance model. Therefore, I propose two concise concepts of governance, respectively 
Governance-in-Contract (GiC) and Governance-in-Practice (GiP), to represent the pre-defined formal 
governance model and the emergent governance practices in ITO. With these two concepts, I pose the 
following research questions:  
 How to distinguish the GiP and GiC in ITO? 
 How are GiP and GiC interrelated in an ITO relationship? 
In contrast to most prior studies where governance models are built to influence practice, I tap into the 
practice in order to examine the relevance of theoretical understandings (Schultz and Hatch, 2005). 
Meanwhile, I adopt a network perspective on GiP for simplicity as well as comprehensiveness 
(Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). Such practice-based network embraces praxes and practices (Reckwitz, 
2002; Vaara and Whittington, 2012) as nodes and ties. In this paper, I will first conceptually illustrate 
the perspective of practice-based network for ITO governance on the stage of psychological contract 
in Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) Moment of Governance (MoG) model. Then the ties of practices are 
investigated as an initial attempt to empirically access GiP and GiC networks in a case study 
combining social network analysis (SNA) and documents analysis. Specifically, I have investigated an 
outsourcing relationship for IT infrastructure services between an insurance company (client) and an 
IT service company (supplier), showing how the structure of GiP is revealed with governance-related 
communication networks, and comparing it to the GiC defined by the contract. 
The following sections are organized as follows. I first explicate the theoretical background of 
governance in ITO; and address the concepts of GiC and GiP, drawing upon social network 
perspective and practice theory with the distinction between praxis and practices. The case study is 
then introduced in the methodology section, focusing on the practices of ITO governance. I continue 
by illustration of empirical findings. The relevance of these results is then reflected in the discussion 
section. And the last part of conclusion summarizes the paper, advances the contributions, and 
suggests implications for practitioners and future research. 
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2 Theoretical background 
2.1 ITO governance 
In the discipline of IT, a widely accepted definition of governance is “the framework for decision 
rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT” (Weill, 2004, p.3). This 
definition covers the pre-specified characteristics of governance models, yet in the specific context of 
ITO practices, governance mechanisms also emerge in the persistent interactions between client and 
supplier. An abundance of literatures have distinguished between contractual governance and 
relational governance (Lacity et al., 2010). Some researchers endorse the combination of these two 
mechanisms of governance, (Goo, et al., 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Sabherwal, 1999; Saunders et 
al., 1997); others attempt to re-organize the governance mechanisms into contract types, namely 
psychological contract and formal/written contract (Koh et al., 2004). Miranda and Kavan (2005) 
proposed a Moments of Governance (MoG) model that synthesizes prior perspectives on ITO contract 
and governance. They suggest a sequential order of two governance stages, promissory contract and 
psychological contract, leading to differentiated inter-organizational rents. The three governance 
options, namely market, hierarchy, and network governance (Adler, 2001), are thus circumscribed by 
the outsourcing context into each governance stage.  
Considering the lifecycle of ITO, I position this paper to study the post-adoption governance. 
Therefore, I zoom in to the governance practices in Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) second governance 
stage of psychological contract, and investigate its two governance alternatives of hierarchy and 
network. Psychological contract facilitates inter-organizational cooperation, and is developed in the 
execution process of promissory contract. This cross-boundary alignment process includes the 
routinized coordination, and non-routinized conflict resolution. Meanwhile, social capital (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998) emerges in the process through three structural elements of control: inter-
organizational linkages, the extent of trust and shared understandings. The distinctive characteristics of 
two types of governance mechanisms, hierarchy and network, are then mapped into these five 
elements of governance at the stage of psychological contract (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Governance alternatives at the stage of psychological contract (Adapted from 
Miranda and Kavan, 2005) 
The hierarchy governance and network governance mapped in Table 1 are two ideal-typical forms of 
governance mechanisms, which can be combined in different proportions according to their contexts 
(Adler, 2001). As an outcome of promissory contract, a formal governance model in the contract 
document represents initial expectations on the ITO governance at the stage of psychological contract 
(Miranda and Kavan, 2005). These expected governance mechanisms can fall into the categories of 
either hierarchy or network governance, or a hybrid form combining both. Moreover, it is not possible 
to cover, by any type of contracts, all the emerging issues in practice (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Therefore, in the psychological stage of governance, the occurrence of conformity and disconformity 
of practice with contract would then further blur the distinction between hierarchy and network 
governance. Although such plural forms of governance have been well discussed in the existing 
literature, many of them are not specifically focused on the ITO context (e.g. Adler, 2001; Bradach 
and Eccles, 1989; Brown, 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Furthermore, most of the relevant studies 
in the scope of ITO governance are built upon the project level (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Heiskanen, 
Newman and Eklin, 2008; Sabherwal, 1999; Tiwana, 2010), with a few exceptions on the 
Elements of governance at psychological contract Hierarchy governance Network governance 
Execution Coordination Document-based Interaction-based 
Conflict resolution Distributive Integrative 
Social 
capital 
Inter-organizational linkages Few and formal Extensive and informal 
Extent of trust Presumed opportunism Presumed trust 
Extent of shared understandings Discrete understandings Shared understandings 
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organizational level (Goo et al., 2009). This study scrutinizes the plural elements of hierarchy and 
network governance in both GiP and GiC, and in both client and supplier organizations. The 
conformity and deviation between practice and contract then reveal their mutual influences on the 
evolution of governance mechanisms of the ITO relationship. 
2.2 Governance-in-Practice and Governance-in-Contract 
As mentioned in the last section, the formal governance model in the contract document is the 
outcome of promissory contract stage and initial expectations of psychological contract stage. I define 
this formal framework as Governance-in-Contract (GiC), which is also comprised with the five 
elements of governance at the stage of psychological contract (See Table 1). The subsequent practice 
in the governance stage of psychological contract is then defined as Governance-in-Practice (GiP). In 
contrast to the concrete and explicit nature of GiC, GiP is emergent in the micro level actions of each 
governance role, and in the macro level interactions between client and supplier. Hence, I will focus 
on the investigation of GiP, and use GiC as a comparative reference.  
It is worth noticing that some studies have already highlighted who the different roles are in IT 
governance, be them on the individual level (Weill, 2004) or on the business unit level (Brown, 1997). 
By identifying the roles, these studies have provided a sketch for the holistic understanding of GiP. 
However, the links between roles are yet to be explored. Weill (2004) breaks down IT governance into 
the locus of decision and input, and how the involved people can be held accountable for their 
collective role. Regarding this elaboration as the point of departure, I develop the network of GiP with 
the distinction between praxis and practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). The 
network perspective captures each individual’s activities in a collective web of interactions (Kilduff 
and Tsai, 2003). However, as I seek for an in-depth understanding of what actually happens when the 
practitioners struggle to achieve effective governance, traditional network perspective focusing on 
purely structural matters is not sufficient (Jack, 2005; art  ne ,  i itriadis,  ubia,    e  and De la 
Fuente, 2003). This objective entails the engagement of practice as a means to connect the macro level 
interactive structures and micro level individual activities. Praxis refers to each practitioner’s 
governance-related actions; and the web of interactive practices is where praxes are embedded, 
consisting of the contact and communication across different governance roles. The network of GiP 
thus embraces practitioners and their individual praxes as nodes, and their interactive practices as the 
assemblage of ties. These elements of GiP network are then mapped into the corresponding elements 
of GiC at the stage of psychological contract. In this way, the networks of GiP and GiC can be 
compared in the same framework (Table 2). Due to the complexity of the framework with various 
elements, its empirical illustration would require multiplicity of methods. Therefore, I concentrate in 
the empirical study on only a portion of the network elements. In particular, I will elaborate in the next 
section how the practices of GiP can be empirically acquired and contrasted with GiC. Therefore, I 
will focus on the coordination in the execution process, and inter-organizational linkages in the 
structure of social capital.  
 
Psychological contract Elements of GiC network Elements of practice in GiP network 
Execution: process Coordination Practices, ties 
Conflict resolution Praxis, nodes 
Social capital: structure Inter-organizational linkages Practices, ties 
Extent of trust Praxis, nodes 
Extent of shared understandings Praxis, nodes 
Table 2 GiC and GiP networks at the stage of psychological contract 
3 Methodology 
As an attempt to illustrate the network structure of GiP and explore its interrelations with GiC in a 
real-life situation, I have conducted an exploratory case study combining social network analysis 
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(SNA) and documents analysis. Case study as an approach to understand the “dyna ic present with 
single settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.534) well suits the purpose to demonstrate the emergence and 
interaction of the two concepts. Meanwhile, due to the exploratory nature of this study, mixed methods 
are adopted to illuminate GiC and GiP with different approaches, so that divergent views of 
governance can be obtained in a single study (Mingers, 2001; Venkatesh, Brown and Bala, 
forthcoming). Specifically, I studied an outsourcing relationship for IT infrastructure services between 
an insurance company (client) and an IT service company (supplier). The process of data collection 
and analysis will show how the practices part of GiP is revealed, and comparing it to the GiC defined 
by the official documents. 
3.1 Case description 
The case study is carried out in both client and supplier companies within an ITO relationship. The 
client company is a large insurance company mainly operating in the Nordic countries (Nordic 
Insurance, a pseudonym, referred to as NI hereinafter), with about 7000 employees. The case study 
initiates in the department of IT services (referred to as DIS hereinafter) in NI which has 61 
employees. The main task of DIS is to manage outsourced IT services with various external suppliers, 
and to serve their internal customers in different Business Areas (referred to as BA hereinafter) of NI. 
One of  IS’s most important outsourcing relationships is established with an IT service supplier called 
Knowledge IT Management (a pseudonym, referred to as KIM hereinafter). KIM is a leading IT 
service company with approximately 18000 employees worldwide, and a core team (referred to as 
KIM1 hereinafter) of 24 people is dedicated to the services for NI, who have direct daily contacts with 
people in DIS. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the companies and departments studied in 
this case; the arrows show the direction of service provision among different units. The outsourcing 
contract was signed in 2005 for IT infrastructure services between DIS and KIM1. Hence it can be 
considered as a long-term and on-going relationship on the stage of psychological contract, and 
therefore serves as a typical case to fulfil the exploratory purpose of this study. The contract concerns 
the services on delivery and development of server and storage, end-user services, mainframe services, 
and other ad-hoc IT projects. 
 
Figure 1 Relationships for IT service provision in the case study 
3.2 Data collection 
I collected data in both NI and KIM in autumn 2012. I started by investigating the communication 
networks among employees from both NI and KIM1. Communication has been associated with the 
effectiveness of IT governance practices (Huang, Zmud and Price, 2010; Weill, 2004) in disseminating 
the governance decisions and forwarding relevant inputs. Especially since I choose to empirically 
focus on the practices part of GiP as an assemblage of ties embracing coordination and inter-
       NI                       KIM 
DIS KIM1 
BA1 
BA2 
BA3 
BA4 
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organizational linkages, the communication networks in the scope of ITO governance can render 
structural insights to fulfil this purpose. 
I applied Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994) 
as an effective tool to describe the relationship patterns and structures among different roles of 
governance. Since a large number of people are involved in the scope of this ITO governance case, I 
opted to focus on the most active ones. Therefore, I first sent out a social network survey to all the 24 
team members in KIM1, requesting each respondent to select his/her most contacted 10 persons from a 
list of NI employees in the communication of technical and non-technical issues. This list is discussed 
and decided together with the team leader of KIM1, and it involves 88 names from both DIS and 
different BA’s of NI. The purpose of this survey was stated in an email sent to all participants, and the 
specific focus on ITO governance was indicated explicitly. Of the 24 people, 23 people, or 95.8%, 
completed the survey. I used UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002) for the SNA. As a result, 
49 people from NI were selected as contacts by KIM1. Then, I held another discussion for a new list 
of active NI employees for this ITO governance with a business liaison manager in DIS, who has the 
most relevant knowledge on the overall picture under investigation. Using the KIM1’s SNA result of 
49 names as a basis, the new list was determined by deleting some of the retired or transferred 
employees, and adding new names with other key roles in the governance. Consequently, 60 people 
were listed for the second SNA, including 36 fro   IS and 24 fro  BA’s. The sa e survey was then 
sent to these NI people identified in the new list, except that the contact list in the questions became 
the 24 KIM1 team members this time. Up to date I have received 51 responses (85%) for the second 
survey. Thus, the technical and non-technical communication networks were unfolded on the ITO 
governance between the units. I will discuss these networks in details in the section of findings. 
Besides the social network survey, I also analysed the appendix on the governance model in the latest 
version of ITO contract last modified in June 2010. It is a Word document with 29 pages, including a 
pre-defined governance model of three levels (i.e. strategic, tactical, and operational), as well as 
relevant tools, processes, and escalation paths. This document provides the secondary data to 
understand the GiC in this ITO relationship, and is referred to as “governance appendix” in the 
following sections. 
3.3 Data analysis 
In accordance with Table 2, the analysis of data incorporates the interpretation of network data for 
practices part of GiP. In addition, GiC is constructed upon the textual material of the governance 
appendix.  
As mentioned in the last section, I began the SNA immediately after collecting the responses of first 
network survey in KIM1, in order to generate the respondents list in the second network survey in NI. 
After I received the responses from the second survey, I analysed the communication structure with 
UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) to calculate the network density between different units (i.e. BAs and 
DIS, KIM1 and DIS) and different governance levels. In directed networks where ties have a direction, 
density is the ratio of the number of actual ties and possible number of ties (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994) between the groups in question. As one of the most widely used group-level index, density is 
used to indicate the degree in which different groups of network members are connected to other 
groups (Haythornthwaite, 1996). Thus coordination and inter-organizational linkages in the 
governance can be illustrated by density values across the network. 
The same elements of coordination and inter-organizational linkages are highlighted with evidences in 
the governance appendix. In this way, I position GiP and GiC in two equivalent networks 
incorporating comparable ties of practices as shown in Table 2. Finally, I contrast the coded categories 
of these two networks with the distinction between hierarchy governance and network governance 
(See Table 1). The findings are presented in the next section. 
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4 Findings 
In this section, I will contrast the GiP to GiC with the distinctive characteristics of hierarchy and 
network governance emerging in the coordination and inter-organizational linkages at the stage of 
psychological contract (see Table 1). Consistent with Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) elaboration on the 
governance stage of psychological contract, inter-organizational linkages concern the distribution and 
patterns of network ties, representing a facet of the structural dimension in social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). And coordination is defined as the processes “integrating or linking together different 
parts of an organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks” (Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 
1976, p.322). For both GiC and GiP, I present first the structural matters of inter-organizational 
linkages, and then the process matters concerning coordination. 
4.1 Governance-in-Contract (GiC) 
In this particular case, the governance appendix of the ITO contract is the only official document 
elaborating the formal governance model. Hence, this document can directly represent the GiC under 
investigation. First, the overview of governance appendix has indicated a formal structure of inter-
organizational linkages a ong different units of  IS, KI 1 and the BA’s. As explicitly termed, 
governance applies to the ITO relationship between two parties, i.e. DIS and KIM1.  
“This Appendix describes the cooperation between the [DIS] and [KIM1]. […]. The governance 
model shall be implemented by both Parties delegating responsibilities to functions and individuals.” 
Although so e of the e ployees fro  different BA’s are also engaged in the governance hierarchy, 
they are expected to only communicate through DIS people, and not directly with KIM1.  
“[DIS] will be the service integrator towards [BA’s], but [KIM1] will co-operate with [DIS] and its 
other suppliers as is set forth in the Agreement.” 
Moreover, the governance structure is designed into three hierarchical levels: strategic, tactical and 
operational. Relevant employees from both DIS and KIM1 are explicitly assigned in different forums 
on each level. For instance, in the forum of “Executive board” on the strategic level, the “[DIS] 
members” involve “CEO, CIO, and head of IT services”; and the “[KIM1] members” involve “CEO, 
head of financial services, strategic customer manager and [specific IT product] business manager”. 
The outputs of forums are mostly distributed horizontally, i.e. to other forums on the same governance 
level; and sometimes also vertically but only to the adjacent forums. Thus, the information is intended 
to flow across various forums in a hierarchical way, and no direct information exchange is determined 
between the strategic and operational levels. Figure 2 demonstrates the vertical flow of decisions and 
outcomes out of selected illustrative forums in the governance appendix.  
 
Figure 2 An example of typical vertical communication structure defined in GiC 
Steering 
Committee 
Executive 
Board 
Account 
Management 
Service 
Management 
Architecture 
Management 
Service 
Operation 
Review 
Project 
Portfolio 
Review 
Service and 
Architecture 
Review 
Strategic 
Tactical 
Operational 
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It is worth noticing that the characteristic of extensive and informal inter-organizational linkages, as in 
network governance, has been mentioned but only once in the vision of governance appendix: 
“The governance model will facilitate a free and open dialogue between the [DIS] and [KIM1] across 
all tiers of the relationships and functional groups.” 
However, as illustrated above, both the overall governance structure among different units and the 
linkages across different governance forums are overwhelmingly hierarchical in the GiC. 
As to the process matters of coordination, the GiC envisions “strong control of the Service, through a 
well-structured governance framework, […]. As such, the governance framework shall touch all parts 
of the Services.”  
Moreover, the governance appendix outlines a list of procedures and standard processes, such as 
“existing [DIS] processes and new processes according to Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL)”. And it “assumes responsibility [of KIM1] that these will work effectively in 
practice”. 
In addition, different responsibilities are pre-defined on different levels of governance. The strategic 
level focuses on non-technical issues such as:  
“Establish and review the broad objectives for the partnership […]. Express the mutual expectations 
[…]. Express and discuss the feedback from executive level review […]. Provide guidance on matters 
of policy, value, integration and the allocation of resources […]. Make high-level decisions relating to 
project scope, timeline, budget and policy.”  
In contrary, the operational level is mainly responsible for technical issues in the processes of 
“incident”, “problem”, “change”, “end-user services”, and “disaster recovery”.  
On the tactical level located between the other two levels, the main processes exhibit a combination of 
both technical and non-technical responsibilities: 
“The main processes governed in tactical governance are: Financial management, performance 
management, resource management, workflow management, contract management, Security and 
Disaster Recovery Services management, technical management.” 
Similar to inter-organizational links, the vision of GiC also resembles some extent of network 
governance concerning coordination, such as interaction, mutual adjustment, and teamwork: 
“The Parties will review and as appropriate modify the governance model over time in light of 
experience and as necessary to meet changing requirements. […] The governance model will provide 
a framework for close collaboration […] to tie together all the different teams […].” 
However, these mutual adjustments “will be agreed and incorporated through the [formal procedure 
of DIS]”. Furthermore, the last modification was finalized in 2010, thus the frequency of revision and 
change is considerably low, and the document remains rather stable over time. 
Therefore, considering overall coordination, the GiC in this ITO relationship emphasizes the 
document-based feature of hierarchy governance, demonstrated by impersonal enforcement of rules 
based on a detailed documentation which intends to be all-inclusive. It also promotes standardized 
processes and plans to guide the expected governance activities, which is also a distinctive 
characteristic of hierarchy governance.  
4.2 Governance-in-Practice (GiP) 
In this study, GiP is represented by the governance-related communication networks in ITO. Table 3 
and Table 4 present the results of calculation by UCINET on network densities between and within 
different groups, regarding communications on both technical and non-technical issues. In the social 
network survey, co  unications on technical issues are indicated as “communication directly related 
to IT, e.g. incidents/problems related to server, application, telecom, etc.”; and those on non-technical 
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issues are “co  unications not directly related to IT, e.g. contract negotiation, budgeting, and other 
 anagerial issues”. In addition, I also recap the survey design that the ties refer to the inter-unit 
linkages between DIS and KIM1, and between  IS and the BA’s. The internal ties within either unit 
are not included in the calculation. The tables also exhibit the direction of communications, i.e. 
initiated by the actors on the first column towards the actors on the first row. 
The linkages of GiP in the tables suggest contrasting governance characteristics in comparison with 
the formal and hierarchical structure in GiC. First, direct contacts can be observed between BA’s and 
KIM1, as shown in the cells painted in grey in Table 3 where the density value is a positive figure. 
Moreover, the density values of the direct links from BA to KIM1 are substantial compared to their 
links to DIS; while the network densities are considerably lower from KIM1 to BA than those from 
KIM1 to DIS. These observations indicate that the practices differ significantly from GiC, in which no 
direct links between the BA’s and KI 1 are suggested, and where the status of BA participants is 
considerably peripheral. Therefore I interpret these direct contacts as informal linkages, a 
characteristic in network governance, departing from the formal and hierarchical governance structure 
among the three units. Furthermore, the supplier (i.e. KIM1) has a higher tendency to conform to the 
contract compared to the business client (i.e. BA). Similarly, the grey cells in Table 4 also show 
evidences of direct linkages between strategic and operational levels in both technical and non-
technical networks which again indicates deviation from the formal model.  
 
Network Density on Technical Issues Network Density on Non-Technical Issues 
 BA DIS KIM1  BA DIS KIM1 
BA 0  0.057 0.056 BA 0 0.051 0.059 
DIS 0.035 0 0.100 DIS 0.046 0 0.115 
KIM1 0.021 0.071 0 KIM1 0.042 0.087 0 
Table 3  Network density between different units 
 
Network Density on Technical Issues Network Density on Non-Technical Issues 
 Strategic Tactical Operational  Strategic Tactical Operational 
Strategic 0.029 0.021 0.053 Strategic 0.071 0.067 0.061 
Tactical 0.011 0.030 0.049 Tactical 0.043 0.042 0.038 
Operational 0.024 0.034 0.049 Operational 0.036 0.032 0.050 
Table 4  Network density between different govenance levels 
Regarding coordination, the GiP also shows both conformity and disconformity to the GiC. The 
formal processes in GiC have set clear boundaries between technical and non-technical responsibilities 
on strategic and operation levels, and determined the tactical level as an intermediary managing both 
responsibilities. Comparing the two parts of Table 4, the density of horizontal ties within each level 
suggests that the operational level actors dominate the technical network, and the strategic level 
becomes more active in the non-technical network. These show the conformity of GiP to the GiC, 
demonstrating a hierarchical feature of the network. However, a considerable extent of disconformity 
is also evident in the table: strategic actors still involve in the technical network, and plenty of 
operational actors also take part in the non-technical network. These observations of exceptions 
indicate that the intended all-inclusive control in GiC is not fully applied in practice. Instead of 
sticking strictly to their assigned responsibilities, different governance roles adjust their 
communicative activities based on the emerging needs of interaction, which resembles the main 
feature of coordination in network governance. 
5 Discussion 
Within the ITO relationship in this case study, I have distinguished and contrasted the GiC and GiP on 
the stage of psychological contract by focusing on the coordination and inter-organizational linkages. 
Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Information Systems
9
The finding shows that while the GiC resembles hierarchy governance in general, the GiP manifests a 
hybrid governance pattern sustaining prominent features in both hierarchy and network governance 
(Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Contrasting GiC and GiP by governance alternatives 
These findings depart from Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) MoG model by (1) separating GiC and GiP 
from the general concept of governance, and (2) discovering in GiP the possibilities of co-existence 
and combination of different governance alternatives on the same stage of psychological contract. The 
hybrid governance mechanism in GiP is evident in the analytic results in Table 5: inter-organizational 
linkages resemble network governance in general; while in the coordination patterns, hierarchy and 
network governance mechanisms are combined and intertwined with each other. Although the GiC is 
found to be generally hierarchical in nature, I also find minor features of network governance, e.g. in 
its vision statements. Therefore, both GiC and GiP can potentially retain hybrid features with co-
existing and intertwined elements of hierarchy and network governance. This is consistent with the 
research stream of plural governance, suggesting that these two governance alternatives are only ideal-
typical forms, that they are combined in different proportions according to the contexts.  
The separation of GiC and GiP would raise further questions, such as how these two concepts are 
interrelated, as concerned by the second research question. The case study has discovered certain 
degree of conformity of GiP to the GiC, showing the influence of GiC on GiP as a reference and 
guideline for practice. And I also interpret this influence as a reason for GiP to still sustain certain 
features of hierarchy governance. Furthermore, out of the SNA method, I have distinguished the GiP 
with the density values among different network groups, and the distinctions of practice and contract 
have also been presented in the findings. I argue that the disconformity of GiP from GiC is the key to 
determine the necessities to modify the GiC. In this way, this study contrasts to prior understandings, 
where governance models are perceived as the precedent of practice, by evaluating the relevance of 
models from practice (Schultz and Hatch, 2005). The next step may be to uncover how relative and 
tangible improvement can be planned in both contract and practice. This question can be answered 
only after close scrutiny on the reasons of the disconformity between GiC and GiP, which requires 
deeper understanding of the praxis out of empirical analysis. Therefore, this further question is not 
included in the scope of this study.   
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have addressed two concepts of GiC and GiP for ITO incorporating social network 
perspective and practice theory with the distinction between praxis and practices. The theoretical 
framework of practice-based network is built on the basis of Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) MoG model 
on the stage of psychological contract. Due to the complexity of the framework concerning empirical 
study, I explored only the “practices” part of the framework in a single case study.  
This study has two major implications for ITO governance research. First, I break down the general 
governance concept into GiC and GiP under the theoretical framework of practice-based network. 
Compared to prior research on plural governance in ITO, this study renders new insights by probing 
deeper into the organizations for the theoretical understanding of governance in ITO research, as the 
separation of these two concepts attains the comparison on the nuances from both perspectives of 
contract and practice within a single case of ITO governance. Second, the application of SNA 
combined with qualitative document analysis provides a practical approach to uncover and contrast 
Selected elements of Psychological Contract Governance alternatives 
GiC GiP 
Structure: Inter-
organizational linkages 
Network density between units Hierarchy  Network  
Network density between governance levels Hierarchy Network 
Process: Coordination Technical and non-technical responsibilities on 
different governance levels  
Hierarchy  Hierarchy and 
network 
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GiC and GiP for both researchers and practitioners. Of course, this design of approach represents only 
one of the effective ways to fulfil this purpose, thus I warmly invite future researches to discover 
various innovative approaches as such to bridge practice and model. 
I consider the partial empirical application of the conceptual framework as a major limitation. I have 
planned future studies to further investigate the praxis of ITO governance by in-depth interviews and 
ethnographic observations. Meanwhile, the SNA is settled upon the density of ties between different 
groups, intra-group communications are excluded from the scope of this study. This might over 
simplify the analysis, as intra-group ties can convey extra information, especially on the network 
between different governance levels. Therefore, deeper analysis on a more complete network would be 
necessary to advance the findings with a higher level of explanation power, as well as an enhanced 
impact on practice. Nevertheless, as an exploratory attempt, I hope this study can be an inspiration for 
future researches to bridge practice and theory in the field of ITO governance. 
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